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RETHINKING WARTIME RADICALISM: THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT AND DREAMS 
OF BRITAIN’S POST-WAR FUTURE* 
KIT KOWOL 
Christ Church, University of Oxford 
 
********************* 
The British general election of 1945 and the return of the nation’s first ever majority 
Labour government was a profound turning point in Britain’s political history. The 
scale of Labour’s victory, and the belief in its inevitability, has, however, obscured 
important developments in British Conservatism. Historians have subsequently 
characterized the Conservative party as either unwilling to develop their own distinct 
plans for the post-war future, or divided between those who were willing to 
embrace the policies of social democracy and those with a neo-liberal approach to 
political economy. This article challenges this depiction by examining the thoughts 
and actions of those within what it terms the wartime ‘Conservative movement’: the 
constellation of fringe and pressure groups that orbited around the Conservative 
party during the period. In examining this movement, it identifies three major 
traditions of Conservative political thinking, and three sets of activists and 
parliamentarians all committed to developing radical Conservative plans for post-
war Britain. The article demonstrates how these different traditions built upon but 
also radicalized pre-existing currents of Conservative thought, how the language of 
social democracy was co-opted and reinterpreted by those within the Conservative 
movement, and how the war changed Conservative perception of the British people.  
********************* 
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The 1945 general election remains one of the most significant moments in British 
political history. * In a bitterly fought contest, the Labour party achieved a landslide 
victory. Labour captured 239 seats in an unprecedented swing of the electoral 
pendulum. The government that followed was transformative. Led by Clement 
Attlee, it developed a mixed-market economy, introduced a comprehensive system 
of social welfare, and began the process of decolonization. Though many of these 
actions have been traced to emerging interwar ‘middle opinion’ and decisions of the 
wartime coalition government, there is little doubt that the nature, speed, and 
extent of these changes was profoundly affected by the election of a Labour, rather 
than Conservative, government.1 
 The scale of Labour’s victory and the importance of the Attlee government 
has meant the campaign has received more attention than any other. Explaining 
Labour’s success has produced detailed work on the campaigns of all major parties, 
plus research into the impact of the press, army education, and rhetoric on the 
election—all areas considered vital to Labour’s victory.2 Importantly, the argument 
over the meaning of the 1945 election—in terms of indicating whether a radical or 
socialist electorate really existed—has long structured the political history of post-
war Britain as well as Labour’s own electoral strategy.3 Likewise, the debate on the 
character of Labour’s policies at and after the election—just how truly ‘social’ and 
‘democratic’ nationalization, for example, really was—has been recognized by 
historians as integral to explaining social democracy’s ‘brief life’ and is another lens 
through which debate on the left is viewed.4  
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Yet, placing wartime politics into a narrative of Labour’s rise and fall is partial 
and problematic. The fact that Labour won in 1945 so convincingly has lent 
Conservative failure a sense of inevitability. As John Charmley has written ‘it is to be 
doubted whether even had the Archangel Gabriel appeared to take charge of the 
campaign, the Tories could have won.’5 As a result, the development of 
Conservatism during the war—as opposed to organizational developments or 
questions of party management—has often been glossed over.6 Moreover, in the 
few works which do pay attention to Conservative ideas, the focus has been 
overwhelmingly on the question of welfare. Divides over William Beveridge’s report 
into the future of the social services—titled Social Insurance and Allied Services but 
popularly known as the Beveridge Report—in November 1942 have been treated as 
coterminous with divides in the Conservative party in other policy areas and at other 
moments during the war.  Historians, as a result, have almost universally depicted 
the Conservative party as divided in two; between those more willing to embrace 
comprehensive social service provision and government economic intervention as 
opposed to those committed to a minimal safety-net and free enterprise.7 Even the 
Conservative party’s two most prominent recent students, E. H. H. Green and John 
Ramsden, followed the trend. Green characterized wartime Conservatives as divided 
between ‘progressives’ and those with a ‘liberal market’ critique, while Ramsden 
preferred the terms ‘progressives’ and ‘reactionaries.’ Those who fell into neither 
camp were allotted by Ramsden a seemingly unproblematic ‘middle’ position.8 
Whatever the nomenclature, the implication has been the same. Conservative 
wartime political thinking was undertaken within strict parameters and on terrain 
dominated by the left. This article seeks to challenge this position, revealing the 
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intellectual vitality of wartime Conservatism and the way Conservatives refashioned 
social democracy to suit their own ends. It does so by examining the actions and 
ideas of those within the Conservative movement. 
The term Conservative movement is usually associated with the United 
States and the various think-tanks (such as the Heritage Foundation), academic-
networks, and periodicals (like The National Review), which from 1945 onwards 
sought to ideologically remake the Republican party.9 A similar constellation of 
organizations, however, has also long existed in Britain. The British Conservative 
movement was made up of MPs, peers, and activists as well as Conservative-leaning 
financiers, industrialists, writers, and academics. Organized around various ginger-
groups, trade associations, dining clubs, journals, and informal political groupings, 
those within this movement competed with each other in their attempts to change 
the trajectory of the Conservative party. Indeed, it was frequently outside the party’s 
official channels and policy making bodies where Conservative ideas were created, 
debated, and refined. 
The Conservative movement flourished in the Edwardian period, at a time 
when many believed Conservatism was in crisis and when groups like the Tariff 
Reform League helped the Conservative party construct a more participatory type of 
activism suited for the new democratic age.10 It arguably reached its peak of 
influence in the immediate years after the First World War (WWI), when the rise of 
Labour forced the party to rethink its strategic position and various Conservative 
anti-waste and anti-alien campaigners helped topple the Lloyd George coalition.11 
Less powerful in the years afterwards, the Conservative movement nonetheless 
remained a permanent fixture of British political and intellectual life between the 
RETHINKING WARTIME RADICALISM   The Historical Journal (forthcoming) 
 
5 
wars, where, as Gary Love has demonstrated, its members used the vibrant right-
wing periodical press to push their particular versions of Conservatism.12 Indeed, 
during the 1930s as a result of Stanley Baldwin’s attempt to tackle the intellectual 
influence of the left—what Clarisse Berthèzene has termed his ‘counter-hegemonic 
project’—groups within the Conservative movement had more spaces than ever to 
promote their views, including via the party’s proto-think-tank Ashridge College 
which had been founded in 1928.13 
As such, when the Conservative party’s own institutional apparatus, including 
its publications and research departments, were shuttered in 1939 as part of the 
Conservative interpretation of the wartime party-truce, and when local Conservative 
associations focused on war-work, Conservative political activity was once more 
redirected into the Conservative movement.14 At a time when Conservatives were 
faced with a leader in Churchill seemingly unwilling to discuss post-war 
reconstruction, the relative absence of traditional Conservative party figures within 
the government, and the sense that the Conservative cause was not being fought 
for, it was in the Conservative movement where most discussion occurred and 
where the party’s public image was constructed. In short, to understand the ways in 
which Conservatives sought to refashion Conservatism during the war, it is to the 
movement, not the party, that historians must turn. 
This article is divided into four parts. The first three of these examine the 
three main political traditions within the wartime Conservative movement: Tory 
Progressives, Individualists, and Constructive Imperialists.15 The term tradition is 
used to indicate a distinct way individuals understood the world around them, and 
the intellectual and political inheritance from which these ideas stemmed.16 Having 
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outlined each tradition’s visions of Britain’s post-war future—from creating a new 
ascetic Christian elite to deepening the bonds of empire—the fourth section 
explores the extent to which the war had transformed their political thought as well 
as making it more visible. Highlighting the power vacuum created by Churchill’s 
leadership, deepened fears of totalitarianism, and transformed ideas about the 
nature of the British people, this fourth section demonstrates how both political and 
ideological factors led members of these traditions to believe that enacting their 
proposals was both more necessary and more possible than ever.  
 
I 
 
The most prominent tradition within the Conservative movement were those who 
thought of themselves as Tory Progressives; a term which captures the way in which 
they used a rhetoric of progress and modernity to further traditional views about the 
organic nature of society and the need for a paternal order.17 This tradition was 
made up of two groups of Conservatives.  First, those who had established careers 
within the party, often within Conservative Central Office itself, like the MPs R. A. 
Butler, Hugh Molson, and David Maxwell Fyfe. Second, a younger generation of 
Conservative MPs, who organized themselves around the Tory Reform Committee 
(TRC), among them the Viscount Hinchingbrooke and Quintin Hogg.  
The latter of these two groups has received the most attention due to the 
TRC’s public attempts to force the Conservative leadership to adopt the Beveridge 
Report, and the fact that historians have often conflated the wartime Committee 
with the post-war Tory Reform Group.18 In reality, though the TRC gained more 
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attention, it was the older generation of Conservatives who played the greater role 
during the war—not least by providing intellectual and institutional support to their 
young charges. 
R. A. Butler was the undoubted centre of this older group of progressive 
Conservatives. A Foreign Office minister between 1938 and 1941, Butler recognized 
the conflict as an opportunity to transform Conservatism. As soon as war was 
declared, he persuaded Neville Chamberlain to create a Central Committee for 
National Policy (CCNP) to draw up what he termed a ‘program for a New England’,19 
To aid him, Butler recruited, among others, the poet T. S. Eliot, the moral 
philosopher Oliver Franks, and the sociologist Karl Mannheim.20 The CCNP was 
consciously not, however, an abstract endeavor but sought to turn theory into 
practice. As Geoffrey Crowther, editor of The Economist and CCNP attendee, stated: 
‘Words such as freedom, justice, have no practical significance for many of the 
working population unless they are translated into concrete facts.’21 Turning theory 
into policy was the CCNP’s main goal. 
The most ambitious proposal developed within the committee was for the 
codification of a new social contract between citizen and the state.22 Drawing on an 
idea developed by ‘radical centrist’ groups in the 1930s such as the Next Five Years 
Group and the organization Political and Economic Planning—many of whose 
members were also part of the CCNP—this new contract included new social rights 
and a guaranteed ‘national minimum’ of income and nutrition levels.23 Yet, just as in 
debates over suffrage eighty years previously, so Tory Progressives argued new 
rights also implied new duties.24 Among the most important of these was peacetime 
military conscription, a policy which received strong support throughout the war 
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from the party’s voluntary wing.25 More than just a practical measure, conscription 
reflected the belief that the willingness of (male) citizens to sacrifice themselves for 
the state was both the traditional and ultimate bond of mutual responsibility 
between people and nation. Moreover, the relative ease of introducing conscription 
during WWII, in contrast to WWI, made many within the CCNP believe citizens were 
willing to undertake onerous responsibilities in other areas, such as giving one year 
of ‘service’ to the state, taking any work offered, and relocating to areas of skills 
shortages.26 
Married to this new social and political compact were plans to widen 
opportunity by broadening the intake of Britain’s private schools, professions, and 
the Conservative party itself – another area in which there was substantial support 
from within the party.27 Such views and the rhetoric of what Butler in 1941 termed a 
new ‘equalitarian England’ could appear quite close to those on the left.28 
Nonetheless, it is wrong to equate the Tory Progressive’s views with the kind of 
wartime egalitarianism that was exemplified in the work of George Orwell and J. B. 
Priestley.29 The rhetoric of ‘equality of sacrifice’ and ‘fair shares’ was employed by 
Tory Progressives but it was frequently used to condemn, not hail, the working-class. 
In an analysis frequently heard within the party’s 1922 Committee of back 
benchers,30 William Weir, CCNP participant and Scottish industrialist, argued that 
factory workers abused the conditions of full employment to demand excessive 
wages while those in uniform suffered low pay.31 Tory Progressives might have 
agreed with Orwell’s description in The Lion and the Unicorn (1941) of England as ‘a 
family with the wrong members in control’ but they did not feel that these wrong 
members were drawn from just the upper class.32 Likewise, Tory Progressives also 
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differed with those on the left over the purpose of reducing inequality which, for 
them, was to ensure that everyone had an equal opportunity to serve and sacrifice 
themselves for the nation. This was deemed necessary to develop a new generation 
of leaders. This would include the young classless RAF officer—the sine qua non of 
wartime reconstruction texts—but also older figures, like the responsible country 
squire, more common to the tory imagination.33 These leaders would also preside 
over what Tory Progressives hoped would be a more Christian nation after the war.  
At one end of the spectrum this desire for a more Christian Britain amounted 
to support for state religious education—a topic again popular among Conservative 
associations.34 At the other, in a proposal made by Butler in May 1941, it took the 
form of a new Christian polity where spiritual and temporal authority were reunited 
and party government was replaced with unified Christian government.35 This 
proposal, which drew on ideas developed by The Moot association of interwar 
Christian intellectuals—a number of whom, like Franks and Mannheim, served on 
the CCNP—was part of the wider belief that only spiritual unity between leaders and 
led could maintain liberty in an era when state planning and economic intervention 
had become essential.36 As such, like those on the left who sought to build socialists 
as well as socialism, so Tory Progressives believed only by making Christians could 
their vision be realized.  
The agenda crafted by Butler and the CCNP was bold yet it nonetheless 
resonated with a sizeable section of the Conservative party. Likewise, though not 
articulated in the same holistic fashion, similar themes were present in a wide range 
of Conservative reconstruction literature—including those by the Marquess of 
Salisbury and Viscount Astor—that covered everything from youth services to the 
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future of the empire.37 Such popularity partly sprang from the fact that many of the 
ideas and proposals put forward by wartime Tory Progressives stemmed from older 
modes of Conservative political thinking. In particular, they fitted closely with the 
interwar ‘new Conservatism’ epitomized by Stanley Baldwin. In the many books and 
pamphlets produced by those who associated themselves with Baldwinite 
conservativism, and especially Ashridge College, many of the same ideas regarding a 
new emphasis on duties,38 the need for a new aristocracy,39 and importance of the 
state in encouraging unselfish devotion can be found.40 Similarly, Baldwin had long 
been keen to present Christianity in non-denominational terms and had aimed to re-
christianize Conservatism.41 The ideas and plans of wartime Tory Progressives were, 
in many ways, interwar Baldwinism shorn of its emollient language and self-
conscious anti-utopianism, and taken to its logical extreme. 
 
 
II 
 
When Viscount Hinchingbrooke complained in 1943 of the ‘damage done to 
this country since the last war by individualist business-men, financiers and 
speculator…creeping unnoticed into the fold of Conservatism’, he was referring to 
men like Sir Ernest Benn.42 Successful publisher and unashamed capitalist, Benn was 
the centre of the Conservative Individualist tradition. Small and bespectacled, he 
began as a Liberal, before arguing in 1929 that the Liberal party needed to commit 
‘harri-kari’ to suffuse Conservatism with free trade doctrine.43 He spent the next 
decade leading a number of organizations which he hoped would form the basis of a 
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popular front of the right, linking what he thought were the soundest elements in 
the Liberal and Conservative parties.44  
By 1941, Benn had become disturbed by the extent of wartime regulation 
and began a publishing ‘blitz’.45 This was followed by the publication of his Manifesto 
for British liberty in August 1942. The Manifesto, which appeared at a time when 
many Conservatives were concerned by Labour’s attempts to repeal the Trades 
Dispute Act (1927), sought to justify Benn’s claim that wartime regulation was a 
cloak for post-war socialism.46 To support his position, Benn created the Society of 
Individualists, a group which had over 30,000 members by the end of the war.47 By 
1943, the Society had been joined by four further organizations set up by 
Conservative parliamentarians whose goals centred around the need to secure the 
minimum of state control and the maximum of individual liberty after the war:  
Progress Trust, Active Back Benchers Group, Fighting Fund for Freedom (FFF), and 
National League for Freedom (NLFF). Together, these five groups, whose 
membership frequently overlapped, formed the backbone of the wartime 
Individualist tradition.  
During the war members of these groups were portrayed as hopelessly out of 
touch. The Society of Individualists was, for example, depicted by cartoonist David 
Low in The Evening Standard as a group of top-hatted capitalists, ermine clad peers, 
and Colonel Blimps.48 Since the 1990s, however, they have increasingly been 
presented as early neo-liberals.49 At first sight this is understandable. There were 
occasional links between wartime Individualists and those who made up the so-
called ‘neo-liberal thought collective’. Waldron Smithers, the leader of the FFF, for 
example, wrote Socialism offers slavery in 1945 as a popular version of F. A. Hayek’s 
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The road to serfdom (1944), one of neo-liberalism's key texts.50 Yet, just as Smithers 
fundamentally misrepresented Hayek—presenting The road to serfdom as a religious 
and empirical critique of state socialism—so later historians have been too quick to 
draw parallels. Early neo-liberals like Hayek and Karl Popper believed state 
intervention was necessary to both ensure a functioning free market and to remedy 
some of the inequalities such a market would generate.51 Wartime Individualists, by 
contrast, were opposed to any expansion in the state. There was nothing ‘neo’ about 
the Individualists’ liberalism or their support for laissez-faire. 
Given their celebration of Victorian political economy, Individualist’s key 
proposal for post-war reconstruction was a return to free trade. Diagnosing the rise 
of Nazism as a product of economic nationalism, men like the Oxford philosopher 
and keen member of the Society of Individualists L. P. Jacks presented free trade as 
the essential building block of any post-war international organization.52 Jacks, with 
arguments explicitly indebted to Richard Cobden, suggested only free trade could 
induce the necessary commercial recovery, economic interdependence, and habit of 
cooperation that would make any successor to the League of Nations successful.53 
Similarly, free trade was hailed by Individualists as the centerpiece of domestic 
revival. As Benn wrote in his 1942 book Hard Times Ahead?, ‘people who can feed 
themselves can afford the folly of Protection; that, however, is not our position.'54 In 
the situation of potential starvation that Benn (and indeed almost all Individualists) 
envisaged after the war, free trade was presented as vital for national survival and to 
return Britain to its role as workshop of the world.55  
Accompanying liberalization of international trade, Individualists also argued 
for a similar freeing of domestic economic activity. This reflected the disquiet that 
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had grown among grassroots Conservative activists since 1941 about the post-war 
future of private enterprise in general and the small trader in particular.56 Activists 
within the NLF, FFF, and the Society of Individualists argued that the totality of 
government measures introduced during the war—direction of labour, rationing, 
food subsidies, purchase controls, capital controls etc.—needed to be removed. By 
doing this, and by cutting the size of the state back to Edwardian levels, Individualists 
claimed the economy would be improved and the nation’s liberties restored.  
Such proposals often led Individualists to be accused of being indifferent to the 
plight of the poor and unemployed. As a critical writer in The Irish Times put it, for all 
their talk of the pre-war comforts of the home life this meant little to those who 
previously been forced to eat only ‘bread and teas’.57 On the one hand, Individualists 
responded to these accusations by highlighting the superior value of constitutional 
liberties. As one writer for the NLFF put it, ‘a free mind with restricted spending 
ability is surely preferable to wealth combined with an enslaved mind.’58 On the 
other, Individualists, like Tory Progressives, were prepared to tackle criticisms on 
their opponent’s territory. As Benn recorded at a meeting of the Provident 
Institution, life insurance and private pensions were themselves a ‘high grade social 
service’.59 They were cheaper when provided by private enterprise and more truly 
social; the profits they generated enriched the entire community not just service 
users. Likewise, as Smithers argued, true equality of opportunity only occurred when 
individual’s life chances were determined by their own choice and initiative rather 
than by bureaucrats.60 Even free trade was given a wartime makeover, and 
presented as it had been in debates over the corn laws as an inherently democratic 
creed. Another of the groups lined to Benn, the Free Trade Legion, stated in 1942 
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that under free trade ‘organised sectional interests’ would finally give way to the 
‘interests of the multitudes of individuals who form the community’.61  
 
III 
 
The resuscitation of an older form of politics was also evident in the final significant 
tradition within the wartime Conservative movement: Constructive Imperialists.62 
This was a tradition whose origins stretched back to Edwardian debates over tariff 
reform, and was made up of those who had come to see the British empire not just 
as an adjunct to British power but as the prime concern of British policy. At the heart 
of this tradition were a group of veteran imperialists, including Leo Amery, George 
Lloyd, and Henry Page Croft. They had cut their teeth advocating greater imperial 
economic unity, and, especially under Baldwin, had often placed the cause of tariff 
reform above party loyalty. As a result, they had been largely excluded from the 
party’s higher councils. They saw the war as the last great opportunity to unite the 
empire and provide a secure footing for its defense.  
Despite their blimpish image—Henry Page Croft advocated arming defense 
volunteers with pikes—this emphasis on imperial security frequently led 
Constructive Imperialists to embrace policies, like family allowances, associated with 
the progressive left.63 Responding to the fear among Conservatives during the war 
about the declining birth rate, Amery, a former colonial secretary, used arguments 
indebted to the Edwardian national efficiency movement to suggest that family 
allowances could solve the problem—in contrast to the proposal to restrict women’s 
education as others within the party, like the Catholic convert and future 
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Conservative MP, Christopher Hollis, advocated.64 Similarly, family allowances, by 
boosting nutritional intake, were also advanced by Amery as a means to improve 
national health—necessary given his belief in the continued relevance of mass 
armies. Indeed, Amery, longtime leader of the Empire Industries Association and 
Secretary of State for India and Burma during the war, suggested that the Beveridge 
Report was at one with the traditions of the party. It was Conservative because of its 
emphasis on the family, and, more importantly, because family allowances, higher 
pensions, and a system of national health had also been the policy of Joseph 
Chamberlain.65  
This link to Chamberlain also explains why many saw the cost of post-war 
reconstruction in general, and the Beveridge Report in particular, as an opportunity 
for imperial unity—the importance of which, given Britain’s likely diminished post-
war standing, was not lost on Conservatives.66 As Amery argued, not only would the 
Beveridge Report increase the size of the home market by raising consumption, it 
would also force the development of closer imperial economic ties by making 
exports more expensive. In short, the Beveridge Report would only be financially 
sustainable if Britain was part of a fully integrated imperial economy.  
It is also this imperial emphasis which explains much of the criticism directed 
at the Beveridge Report from within the ranks of the Conservative imperialists. 
Those wedded to the cause of imperial unity were, for example, deeply concerned 
about the Report’s effect on prospects for empire settlement—the significance of 
which had been underlined during the war due to Britain’s financial and military 
dependence on the Dominions and colonies.67 As such, when Constructive 
Imperialists like Basil Peto MP called for a delay in implementing the Report’s 
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proposals it was often because they believed the scheme needed to be part of an 
imperial plan, not because they objected in principle. As Amery proclaimed in a 
speech delivered in Birmingham in March 1943, 'only a planned and controlled trade 
and industrial policy can sustain a planned social system in a highly competitive 
world.’68 The implication was clear: if Britain was to have a more developed system 
of social welfare, the state needed to undertake economic planning. 
Economic planning also had a rich history amongst Constructive Imperialists.69 
The Empire Economic Union (EEU) and the Empire Industries Association (EIA) 
advocated planning in the 1930s as part of their proposals for scientific tariffs, which, 
when combined with proto-Keynesian demand management, were presented as an 
alternative to socialist physical planning.70 During the war this commitment to 
planning and Keynesian budgetary policy was extended to numerous areas of 
reconstruction by those associated with the EEU and EIA, including transport policy 
and the location of industry,71 and, in keeping with their imperial ambitions, was 
expanded to encompass the empire.72 David Gammans, EIA member and 
Conservative MP, produced the most ambitious of these proposals. A former civil 
servant in Malaya, Gammans believed Britain’s failures in the Far East had occurred 
because colonies and Dominions had been treated as isolated units.73 In response, 
Gammans sought to bind colonial and domestic reconstruction together to reinforce 
interdependence between Britain and her empire. To attain this interdependence, 
Gammans advocated establishing a common minimum standard of social service 
across the empire, harmonized benefit levels (to promote empire settlement), and a 
shared cultural and educational policy. All of this was to be administered by a 
common imperial civil service.  
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Despite this emphasis on a new pan-imperial civil service, Gammans and other 
wartime Constructive Imperialists nonetheless remained wedded to parliamentary 
government in a way that some like Butler were not.74 As Amery wrote in his 1944 
pamphlet The future of parliament, to be successful post-war Conservatism needed 
to be radical but, ‘at the same time it must never lose its contact with the root of our 
greatness or lose sight of the value of our national institution'.75 This did not mean 
leaving Parliament exactly as it had been. In order to maintain the legitimacy of 
parliamentary government, Constructive Imperialists argued that Parliament needed 
to better represent the nation. On the one hand, this would entail going back to a 
model of functional representation and multi-member boroughs (integral to the pre-
1832 constitution) in order to represent specific economic interests and the diversity 
of the modern city. On the other hand, it meant embracing untested ideas like 
proportional representation, life peerages for those with specialist economic 
knowledge, and a new imperial parliamentary radio channel to ensure that all 
citizens across the empire engaged with the politics of the mother democracy.  
 
V 
 
These, then, were the three main traditions within the wartime Conservative 
movement. Though only some were willing to embrace policies associated with 
social democracy, all were happy to adapt the language of progressive politics—
equality, democracy and active citizenship—in order to further longstanding 
Conservative aims.  Yet, the wartime Conservative movement and the ideas its 
members embraced were not just a continuation of pre-existing tory politics. Older 
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ideas and arguments, like those over free trade versus tariff reform, had been 
resuscitated, but a new urgency was added to them out of Conservative’s belief that, 
unless their plans and policies were put into effect, totalitarianism would emerge in 
Britain. 
 The term ‘totalitarian’ was first used to describe Mussolini’s 1923 electoral 
reforms.76 By the 1930s the concept had broadened into a description of any 
attempt to monopolize power—be it political, intellectual, moral or religious. During 
the 1930s, and especially after Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933, there had been a 
fear among some Conservatives, notably Baldwin, that a form of totalitarianism 
might appear in Britain—one driven by a fickle electorate and new methods of mass 
communication.77 During the war this fear grew in breadth and intensity. The conflict 
had led to the creation of new tools and techniques to manage and regulate the 
economy, and had seen unprecedented attempts to monitor and manipulate public 
opinion. While most agreed that during the conflict that this was necessary to win 
the war, the fear lurked that come peacetime the enhanced power of the state 
might be used for nefarious purposes. 
 Crucially, however, while many within the wartime Conservative movement 
feared the possibility of totalitarianism in post-war Britain, they were divided over 
where they believed the totalitarian threat would spring from. For Individualists like 
Ernest Benn—who in 1942 had argued that too many thought of totalitarianism ‘only 
as a matter of Gestapos, rubber truncheons and the persecution of Jews’ and ‘forget 
that it started with a long catalogue of social reforms’—it was the character of the 
electorate that was the problem.78 The growth of government activity since 1914 
had, in Benn’s mind, reduced the individuals capacity for moral development so 
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much that the electorate were now incapable of resisting the bait of further social 
reform presented by demagogues. Tory Progressives like Butler meanwhile placed 
the greatest emphasis on the character of the political elite. Men who lacked strict 
Christian piety would be unable withstand the temptation of monopolizing and 
abusing state power. Constructive Imperialists, by contrast, focused on the place of 
parties within the British political system. Amery, for example, updated the analysis 
of liberal constitutional theorists—including A. V. Dicey and W. E. H. Lecky—about 
the development of the party caucus in the 1880s to explain how the Nazi party, 
controlled from outside the Reichstag, had overridden constitutional safeguards—
something which he feared the Labour party, with its trade union link, was also 
capable of.79  
Nor were such views entirely fanciful given the prominent position within the 
Labour party of those like Stafford Cripps and Harold Laski, who had previously 
questioned the values of democracy—the former, for example, had suggested in 
1933 that any incoming socialist government would need to treat opposition as 
sabotage.80 Churchill’s infamous ‘gestapo speech’ in the 1945 general election 
campaign might have backfired, but he would not have made it had he thought that 
no one would have agreed with his views.81 Nonetheless, for all the importance of 
the war in deepening fears among wartime Conservatives, so paradoxically it also 
created hope amongst them that their plans and policies would be put into effect. 
Much of this was due to the changed dynamics within the Conservative party. 
The relative lack of success those within the Conservative movement had 
encountered during the 1930s in changing the party’s outlook, leadership, and 
policy, had largely been caused by the party’s electoral success and the type of 
RETHINKING WARTIME RADICALISM   The Historical Journal (forthcoming) 
 
20 
consensual, seemingly non-ideological, Conservatism that Baldwin did so much to 
promote and Chamberlain later embraced.82 Large majorities in 1931 and 1935 (and 
the prospect of similar success in the anticipated 1940 general election) meant the 
Conservative-dominated National governments had little need to pay attention to 
their own Conservative critics.83 The argument common to so many within the 
Conservative movement that only their form of ‘true’ Conservatism held the key to 
electoral survival had been proved false.84 
The Second World War and the fall of Chamberlain—in the end partly the 
work of a group of Conservative MPs led by Lord Salisbury operating within the 
Conservative movement—fundamentally changed the political circumstances in 
which Conservatives operated.85 For much of the war, Conservatives were 
concerned not only that they would likely lose an election, but that the entire culture 
of Conservatism, from private schools to capitalist industry, was under threat.86 It 
was only once military victory was assured that Conservative electoral success 
seemed (wrongly) assured. Likewise, the war had seen the grip Baldwin, and then 
Chamberlain, exerted over their Party removed, allowing critics of their positions—
or those like Butler who simply wanted to push Baldwinite Conservatism further and 
faster than the leadership thought wise—more space to operate. Nor was an 
alternative political or ideological position staked out by the party’s new leader. 
Unwilling for most of the war to discuss postwar reconstruction from a party point of 
view, unable to devote energy to question party management, and distrustful of 
Conservative Central Office, Churchill’s actions only increased the size of the political 
vacuum which those in the Conservative movement were happy to fill.87 Indeed, 
with his tendency to promote precisely the kind of Conservatives who had been 
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critical of Baldwin and Chamberlain, Churchill’s leadership offered those within the 
Conservative movement both the opportunity to re-enter government and shape 
the future of conservativism from within Whitehall (as was the case with Amery), or 
to capture the party’s own policy making process (the route Butler took). Moreover, 
if changes at the elite level of British politics offered hope to those in the 
Conservative movement that their views could finally become manifesto material, so 
perceived changes to popular political attitudes convinced Conservatives that the 
electorate would embrace them. 
As with their fear of totalitarianism, however, Conservatives from different 
traditions expressed their optimism about the character of the British electorate in 
distinctive ways. During the interwar period Individualists had frequently railed 
against the ‘softness’ of the electorate and the tendency to look to the state for 
solutions.88 By contrast, by the end of WWII, groups like the National League for 
Freedom celebrated how the war had finally taught the British people the value of 
their historic liberties. Even better, wartime social changes convinced many 
Individualists that this value shift would be permanent. At the Society of 
Individualists first public meeting in 1943, for example, Benn declared demands for 
confiscatory taxation were now less attractive since ‘the stately homes of England 
have become material for archaeologists’ and ‘everything we had has been placed 
upon the altar of patriotism’.89 Likewise, the soap magnate Viscount Leverhulme 
argued at the same event that the broadening of the ‘income tax paying class’ meant 
calls for higher social spending would fall on increasingly deaf ears.90  
Constructive Imperialists also had reasons to be optimistic. The centrifugal 
forces that had been pulling the empire apart appeared to have been put in reverse. 
RETHINKING WARTIME RADICALISM   The Historical Journal (forthcoming) 
 
22 
Indeed, the idea that Britain had faced Nazism single-handedly in 1940—one 
element of what Angus Calder termed ‘the myth of the blitz’—was not one that 
Constructive Imperialists would have recognized.91 Rather, as Amery declared in a 
speech to the Oxford University Conservative Association: 'When, at the collapse of 
France, we stood alone, the word 'we' meant not England only but a brotherhood in 
arms bound together by common ideal and loyalties.’92 Moreover, this reality was 
one which Amery and other Constructive Imperialists believed the British people had 
finally learnt to appreciate. Whether it was British and Indian soldiers in Italy 
conversing in a blend of English, Italian and Hindi, or the donations flowing into 
charities such as the Indian Comforts Fund, Constructive Imperialists believed that 
Britons had rediscovered their imperial consciousness as a result of the war.93 
Similarly, Tory Progressives had cause for hope about the nation’s spiritual 
condition. The ‘crusading spirit’ that Henry Brooke had called for in 1940, where the 
nation showed its real commitment to Christianity, was a spirit which by the end of 
the war seemed close to being realized.94 Not only did providential language and 
protestant imagery suffuse wartime art and literature, as Matthew Grimley has 
argued, but the relationship between church and state was being strengthened 
through such institutions as national days of prayer.95 Indeed, with the introduction 
of compulsory religious education in Britain’s schools as a result of The Education Act 
(1944)—a piece of legislation not coincidentally presided over by Butler—it was 
hoped that all future generations would be more inclined to support the kind of 
policies advocated by Tory Progressives.  
The experience of the Second World War had thus changed Conservative 
political thinking in important ways. Plans, policies, and justifications for them drew 
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on long-held Conservative ideas, but the fear of totalitarianism lest they be 
implemented was greater than ever and so too the optimism that they could be 
implemented. The impact of this change was felt in the development of the party’s 
official policy during the war. 
 
VI 
 
Official Conservative pronouncements about the post-war future were limited during 
the war. It was only in 1941, after considerable pressure from the party’s grassroots 
to respond to reconstruction plans emerging from the left, that Churchill agreed with 
some reluctance to the formation of a Post-War Planning Central Committee 
(PWPCC).96 The PWPCC was chaired for the most part by Butler. During its years of 
operation the PWPCC did produce a number of genuinely novel and radical plans, 
particularly in the field of education and youth services. Yet, such novelty was only 
present when Butler was able to ensure the membership of the PWPCC’s policy sub-
committees reflected his own personal views. The education sub-committee, who 
produced the most radical reports, was, for example, chaired by the publisher 
Geoffrey Faber who had earlier worked with Butler in the Central Committee for 
National Policy.97 Where there was more of an ideological balance within the 
PWPCC’s sub-committees reports were either postponed indefinitely, avoided major 
innovations in policy, or hedged with such major qualifications as to reduce their 
political significance. For example, the sub-committee on industry, which took nearly 
three years to produce its report, accepted the principle of placing security of 
employment ahead of increasing overall national wealth but refused to explain how 
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this would impact tariff policy and failed to commit to, or use the language of, full 
employment.98 From October 1944 onwards, after Butler decided that he needed to 
better represent party opinion, such problems worsened with few additional reports 
produced in the run up to the election.99 As such, by 1945, no distinct Conservative 
message been crafted. The party’s election campaign was instead fought largely 
around Churchill’s leadership, with the primary theme of the 1945 Conservative 
manifesto—which did not even include the term ‘Conservative’—being that the 
Conservative program was a tested and practical one.100 Yet, as demonstrated, this 
personalised approach to the campaign was taken not because the party lacked its 
own set of bold or radical ideas, but quite the opposite: it was the surfeit of these 
ideas that was the issue.  
Here, the role of ‘totalitarianism’ is key. Not only were Conservative’s analyses 
of how post-war Britain should be rebuilt different to one another but they were 
also incompatible. For example, while some Tory Progressives called for the creation 
of a new non-party Christian elite to govern Britain in order to prevent 
totalitarianism, this anti-parliamentary attitude was at odds with Constructive 
Imperialist’s belief that Britain’s parliamentary system needed to be strengthened to 
avoid a Weimar style collapse. Likewise, both Constructive Imperialist’s and Tory 
Progressive’s desire for greater economic and social planning conflicted with 
Individualist’s belief that regulation of the individual limited his or her capacity for 
moral development and thus increased the chance of totalitarianism. In short, what 
was a solution to the problem of totalitarianism for members of one tradition was 
often its cause for another.  
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It was this incompatibility of views within the Conservative party as much as 
between the Conservative party and Labour which explains Churchill’s wariness 
about discussing post-war reconstruction. With a limited mandate both as Prime 
Minister and Conservative leader, Churchill sat precariously atop not one but two 
delicate ideological coalitions neither of which he could afford to disrupt. The party’s 
1945 election manifesto, with all its invocations of practicality, was not just 
‘ideological’ because, as E. H. H. Green has argued, a preference for pragmatism is 
itself an ideological claim, but because it was a compromise necessary for a party 
fundamentally divided between different radical approaches to the post-war 
world.101  
Whether the Conservatives could have won in 1945, or at least done better, 
had they put forward their own radical plans is unknowable—though some have 
suggested they might have done.102 What is the case, however, is that the existence 
of these plans and the combination of optimism and fear that motivated them had 
effects on the way in which wartime politics occurred. Politics is inherently multi-
dimensional and the internal disputes of one party offers options and possibilities for 
another. This was particularly the case during WWII, where the leaders of the Liberal 
and Labour parties, both committed to staying within the wartime coalition, faced 
activists frustrated with the strictures of wartime politics. Here the existence of 
radical groups within the Conservative movement helped persuade Liberal and 
Labour dissenters to fall in line. The Liberal leader, Archibald Sinclair, facing calls in 
late 1942 from the Liberal Radical Action group to exit the coalition, argued that the 
existence of so many groups to the right of the Conservative party made it likely that 
the party system would break up after the war.103 As a result, so Sinclair argued, it 
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was more vital than ever for Liberals to remain united in order to reap electoral 
dividends after the war. Clement Attlee similarly used the existence of these groups 
to aid maneuvers with his own party. Faced with demands in 1944 to end the by-
election truce, while preventing ministers from campaigning, Attlee argued that with 
ministers gagged it would only aid those critical of the government, like leader of the 
Active Back Benchers Sir Herbert Williams, and ensure more right-wingers entered 
Parliament.104 It was, therefore, paradoxically the existence of those who were 
highly critical of the wartime coalition that did much to keep it together. 
 
V 
 
Where does this examination of the dynamics of the wartime Conservative 
movement leave our wider interpretation of the politics of the Second World War? 
In the perennial debate about the existence of a popular wartime political 
‘consensus’, the evidence suggests that there was a desire among many 
Conservatives to deliver equality of opportunity, provide greater public services, and 
undertake economic planning. Yet, these terms frequently encoded Conservative 
meanings. The language of social democracy pervaded wartime British political life, 
but it was often used to forward ideas that would have horrified social democrats. 
The use of concepts like equality of sacrifice to divide society rather than unite it—
which, as Camilla Schofield has argued, was key to Enoch Powell’s appeal to working-
class white voters in the 1960s—was a tactic which had occurred from the moment 
of its inception.105 Social democracy’s rhetorical foundations were more than shaky, 
they could actively help pull down the edifice.  
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Moreover, while it has long been clear that there was considerable discord 
between the Labour and the Conservative parties over their approach to post-war 
reconstruction, it is evident that were important divides within these parties as 
well.106 Just as Stephen Brooke has shown how, during the war, the Labour party 
remained divided on important questions of policy—notably around 
nationalization—the Conservative movement had its own disagreements about ends 
as well as means.107 Not only was there no consensus over the need for increased 
social welfare and the role of the state in the economy—the familiar 
liberal/paternalist divide—but also key differences over imperial policy, the place of 
the established church in national life, and even, for some, the desirability of 
parliamentary government itself. For once it was Labour rather than the 
Conservatives who were better able to paper over ideological division. 
The breadth of this disagreement also highlights the extent to which political 
argument during the Second World War was not just couched in terms of those who 
did and did not support social democratic policies. Those on the right were perfectly 
capable of adopting some elements associated with social democracy—a more 
managed form of capitalism, for example—while also rejecting others. Likewise, as 
the Constructive Imperialists demonstrated, the support for policies contained in the 
Beveridge Report often occurred both because these policies could be interpreted in 
a Conservative light but also because they suited longer term ends like further 
imperial economic integration.  
Nor was it the case that neo-liberalism was the alternative to social 
democracy. Not only was wartime opposition to central planning more often 
couched in classical liberal rather than neo-liberal terms, but such a response was 
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one of a variety that were available to Conservatives—many of which, as discussed 
above, were incompatible with each other. The suggestion by E. H. H. Green that we 
can find within the wartime Conservative party the origins of Thatcherism is 
anachronistic.108 To paraphrase Andrew Gamble’s analysis of Thatcherism, wartime 
Conservatives either supported the strong state or the free market—none supported 
both.109 Instead of anticipating the ideological developments of the 1980s, wartime 
Conservatives were in fact more likely to draw on arguments from the 1890s. 
Whether this was Butler arguing for united temporal and spiritual authority, L. P. 
Jacks repeating arguments made by the Anti Corn Law League, or Leo Amery 
interpreting the threat of totalitarianism through the lens of late-Victorian fears of 
caucus politics, the Second World War drove Conservatives to look back as well as 
forward.  
This insight also allows for a more rounded answer to the question of whether 
the Second World War ‘radicalized’ British politics. Here, the evidence of the 
wartime Conservative movement suggests that it did little to create new or 
drastically different approaches to politics and the economy. Even such bold ideas as 
the need for a new spiritual aristocracy had been foreshadowed in the 1930s years, 
when, as others have recently shown, Conservative intellectual culture remained rich 
and dynamic despite the seeming hegemony of Baldwinian Conservatism.110 Rather, 
the effect of the war and the fall of Chamberlain had been to persuade many 
Conservatives that the introduction of long-held but previously marginalized ideas 
was both more necessary and more possible. These ideas were necessary because of 
the fear of totalitarianism less they be adopted, and possible because of changes to 
the Conservative party and the supposed values of the British people.  
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Finally, the sheer vitality of the wartime Conservative movement demonstrates 
how the left were not the sole dynamic political force in the period. The image 
painted by Paul Addison in The Road to 1945, that ‘the student immersed in wartime 
polemics sees, in his overheated imagination, Colonel Blimp being pursued through a 
land of Penguin Specials by an abrasive meritocratic, a progressive churchman, and J. 
B. Priestley’, needs to be redrawn.111 Not only was Colonel Blimp not a purely 
reactionary character, but this land of Penguin Specials was also one filled with 
books and articles that made the Conservative case for the future. Indeed, within 
this world, it was often the abrasive meritocratic, progressive churchmen, and J. B. 
Priestley who were the pursued rather than the pursuers.  
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